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Abstract 
The aim of this preliminary study was to estimate the proportions of seropositive horses on 
infected premises (IPs) in order to assess the attack risk of the disease. Logistic regression 
analyses were conducted to evaluate the differences in attack risks between enterprise sizes 
and predefined spatial clusters/regions. The average attack risk experienced during the 
outbreak was 96.88% (median 100%) but it differed according to the size of the enterprise 
and other geographical and demographic conditions. The highest attack risks were observed 
in the Dubbo cluster/region and the lowest in the Narrabri–Northern cluster. Properties with 
fewer horses were generally more likely to have higher attack risks than larger enterprises 
though this was not true for all cluster/region. 
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Equine influenza (EI) is a highly infectious disease with a considerably higher attack risk 
(proportion of the animals-at-risk that become infected) in naïve horse populations1 
compared to vaccinated or previously exposed populations 2, 3. As expected, very high attack 
risks were observed during the first EI outbreak in Australia, in 2007, due to the generally 
naïve horse population. On most infected properties (IPs), all horses became infected within a 
short period of time, but on some IPs, a proportion of the horses were seronegative when 
retested a month or more after first being declared an IP. This study was conducted to 
estimate the attack risk of the disease and to compare the attack risk between enterprise 
sizes and predefined spatial clusters/regions.  
 
Materials and methods 
 
The EI dataset maintained by NSW Department of Primary Industries was queried to extract 
the results of blocking ELISA (bELISA) undertaken on horses tested more than 25 days after 
the properties were first declared to be IPs. Properties on which none of the tested horses 
were seropositive were excluded from the analysis because they were unlikely to have been 
infected. Proportions of seropositive horses of the total number of horses tested were 
calculated for each property as an estimate of the attack risk. To make comparisons of attack 
risks between enterprise sizes, properties were categorised on the basis of number of horses 
sampled on each property into small (up to 5 horses), medium (6 to 20 horses) and large (>20 
horses) enterprises. Note that in the absence of information about actual number of horses, 
the numbers of horses sampled were used as a surrogate measure of enterprise size. 
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to evaluate the differences in attack risks 
between predefined clusters/regions and between enterprise sizes. Initially univariable 
logistic regression analyses were conducted to test the unconditional association of 
cluster/region and enterprise size with the outcome. This was followed by fitting 
multivariable models by including both the variables and their interaction term in the model 
(retained if significant).  
Similar analyses were conducted to evaluate the association of cluster/region and enterprise 
size with the probability of detecting at least one seronegative horse. All statistical analyses 
were conducted using SAS statistical software (release 9.1, © 2002-03, SAS Institute Inc., 
Cary, NC, USA). 
 
Results 
Of more than 6000 recorded IPs, a total of 1772 were identified as meeting the inclusion 
criteria and were included in this analysis. Attack risk - the proportions of seropositive horses 
on properties- ranged from 9.09% to 100.00% (mean 96.88%; median 100%). Significant 
differences in attack risk were observed between clusters/regions and enterprise sizes. 
Highest attack risks were observed in Dubbo cluster/region and lowest in Narrabri-Northern 
cluster (Table 1). Properties with fewer horses (up to 5 horses sampled) were more likely to 
have higher attack risk than larger enterprises (>20 horses sampled). The interaction between 
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cluster/region and enterprise size was significant in the multivariable logistic regression 
model, indicating that the attack risk was not consistently higher in smaller enterprises for all 
clusters/regions (see the adjusted odds ratios presented in Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive and univariable logistic regression analyses to evaluate the differences 
in attack risks between clusters/regions and enterprise sizes during the 2007 equine 
influenza outbreak. The results are based on properties tested >25 days after being 
declared as infected properties (IPs).  
 
Variable Categories Total  
horses 
Number (%) 
seropositive  
 Univariable odds  
ratios (95% CI) 
P 
Cluster/region       <0.001 
 Dubbo 747 734 (98.26%)  8.49 (4.72, 16.40)  
 Hunter valley 2159 1922 (89.02%)  1.22 (0.88, 1.66)  
 Maitland-Central coast 2844 2742 (96.41%)  4.04 (2.84, 5.68)  
 Parkes 586 566 (96.59%)  4.25 (2.55, 7.38)  
 Sydney south 5570 5410 (97.13%)  5.08 (3.65, 6.98)  
 Tamworth 1151 1028 (89.31%)  1.26 (0.89, 1.76)  
 Other 353 336 (95.18%)  2.97 (1.73, 5.37)  
 Narrabri-Northern
a
 421 366 (86.94%)  1.00   
        
Enterprise size
b
       <0.001 
Small (≤5 horses) 3166 3073 (97.06%)  2.23 (1.78, 2.82)  
Medium (6-20 horses) 3782 3583 (94.74%)  1.22 (1.02, 1.445)  
 Large (>20 horses)
 a
 6883 6448 (93.68%  1.00   
a 
Reference category for logistic regression analyses 
b 
Number of horses sampled was used as a surrogate indicator for enterprise size:  small enterprise (≤5 horses 
sampled); medium enterprise (6–20 horses sampled); large enterprise (>20 horses sampled). 
CI, confidence interval. 
 4 
 
Table 2. Association of cluster/region and enterprise sizea with attack risk on infected NSW properties during the 2007 equine 
influenza outbreak in Australia. Adjusted odds ratios are based on the multivariable logistic regression model of attack risk on 
region/cluster, enterprise size and their interaction. 
 
 
 Clusters/regions 
Total number of horses tested   Number (%) of horses positive   Adjusted odds ratios 
Small Medium Large   Small Medium Large   Small Medium Large
b
 
Dubbo 193 304 250  192 (99.48%) 294 (96.71%) 248 (99.20%)  2.32 0.36 1.00 
Hunter valley  171 324 1664  156 (91.23%) 285 (87.96%) 1481 (89.00%)  1.93 1.35 1.00 
Maitland-Central coast  622 662 1560  599 (96.30%) 647(97.73%) 1496 (95.90%)  1.67 2.77 1.00 
Parkes 159 216 211  153 (96.23%) 206 (95.37%) 207 (98.10%)  0.74 0.60 1.00 
Sydney south 1618 1419 2533  1582 (97.78%) 1382 (97.39%) 2446 (96.57%)  2.35 1.99 1.00 
Tamworth  280 490 381  272 (97.14%) 447 (91.22%) 309 (81.10%)  11.89 3.63 1.00 
Other 66 136 151  65 (98.48%)  128 (94.12%)  143 (94.70%)  5.46 1.34 1.00 
Narrabri-Northern 57 231 133   54 (94.74%) 194 (83.98%) 118 (88.72%)   2.29 0.67 1.00 
a 
Number of horses sampled was used as a surrogate indicator for enterprise size: small enterprise (≤ 5 horses sampled); medium enterprise (6-20 horses 
sampled); and large enterprise (>20 horses sampled). 
b 
Reference category for logistic regression analyse
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Discussion 
 
All of the tested horses were seropositive on 1547 of the properties (87.30%) but at least one 
horse was seronegative on the remaining 225 properties (12.70%). The proportions of 
properties with at least one seronegative horse were significantly different in different 
clusters/regions and enterprise sizes (Tables 3). For example, properties in Dubbo 
cluster/region had 80% less chances of having at least one seronegative horse than properties 
in Narrabri-Northern cluster. Similarly, smaller enterprises had 94% less chances of having at 
least one seronegative horse compared to larger enterprises (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Descriptive, univariable and multivariable logistic regression analyses to evaluate 
the association of cluster/region and enterprise size with the probability of at least one 
horse remaining seronegative on infected properties (IPs) during the 2007 equine influenza 
outbreak. P-values are presented only for the multivariable model but were similar for the 
univariable models. 
 
Variable Categories Total  
number 
of IPs 
IPs with  
at least one  
seronegative  
horse (%) 
Univariable odds  
ratios (95% CI) 
  Adjusted odds  
ratios (95% CI) 
P 
 
Cluster/region         <0.001 
 Dubbo 106 7 (6.60%) 0.17 (0.06, 0.45)  0.20 (0.07, 0.56)  
 Hunter valley  125 49 (39.0%) 1.52 (0.74, 3.13)  1.73 (0.79, 3.92)   
 Maitland-Central coast  325 38 (11.69%) 0.31 (0.15, 0.64)  0.45 (0.21, 1.00)  
 Parkes 95 8 (8.42%) 0.22 (0.08, 0.56)  0.27 (0.09, 0.73)  
 Sydney south 850 73 (8.59%) 0.22 (0.11, 0.43)  0.33 (0.16, 0.71)  
 Tamworth  178 30 (16.85%) 0.48 (0.23, 1.00)  0.62 (0.28, 1.40)  
 Other 46 6 (13.04%) 0.35 (0.12, 1.02)  0.41 (0.12, 1.24)  
 Narrabri-Northern
a
 47 14 (29.79%) 1.00   1.00   
          
Enterprise size
b
         <0.001 
Small (≤5 horses) 1262 74 (5.86%) 0.05 (0.03, 0.08)  0.06 (0.04, 0.09)  
 Medium (6-20 horses) 387 84 (21.71%) 0.23 (0.15, 0.36)  0.24 (0.15, 0.37)  
  Large (>20 horses)
 a
 123 67 (54.47%) 1.00     1.00   
a 
Reference category for logistic regression analyses 
b 
Number of horses sampled was used as a surrogate indicator for enterprise size 
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High attack risks observed in the current outbreak are characteristic of EI outbreaks in naïve 
populations, whereas the attack risks are usually lower in vaccinated horses or in previously 
exposed populations. Morbidity rate was only 19.4% in an EI outbreak involving regularly 
vaccinated horses in Japan 2 in August 2007, probably the source of the virus that cased the 
outbreak in Australia.  
 
Interestingly, a small number of properties had quite low attack risks, as low as 10%. The 
reasons for this are unclear, but could include false-positive reactions on properties that were 
never infected (specificity of the bELISA used in the response was estimated at about 97%4) or 
false negative reactions in horses that were exposed to the virus but had not seroconverted 
by the time of sampling. Alternatively, properties with low attack risk could have been due to 
infected premises where the infection diminished before it had a chance to infect all horses.  
 
The differences in attack risks in different clusters/regions could be due to differences in 
geographic, social or demographic factors, but needs further evaluation. For example, many 
of the infected properties in the Narrabri/Northern cluster (the cluster with the lowest 
seroprevalence) were larger, rural properties compared to smaller peri-urban properties in 
some clusters/regions (Dubbo, Sydney-South, Parkes, Maitland-Central Coast). The larger 
property size provided opportunity for less dense horse populations and presumably slower 
spread, so that some horses might have avoided exposure before the infection diminished on 
the property.  
 
Infection of a greater proportion of horses on properties with a fewer number of horses could 
be due to comparatively smaller property area facilitating spread of virus in close contact 
horses. Note that we used sample size as a surrogate measure for the number of horses on a 
property because an accurate estimate of number of horses was not available at the time of 
analyses. We acknowledge that this could have introduced bias in our estimates. 
 
To sum up, this preliminary investigation indicated that not all of the horses on infected 
properties became infected during the EI outbreak and the proportions of horses that 
became infected were not similar for different enterprise sizes or for different geographical 
and demographic conditions. Further analysis of the data is recommended to provide insights 
into the epidemiology of EI, particularly the spread of infection within naïve populations 
under Australian conditions. 
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